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The Market for Residential Leaseholds
T
HEmarket for residential leaseholds is a large one, and of consid-
erable importance to the economy. As indicated in Chapter 3,
the number of rented nonfarm homes has exceeded the number of
owner-occupied homes at each census date since 1890; in 1940 there
were over sixteen million rented homes with an aggregate annual
rental estimated as approximately $4.7 billion.1 Differences and simi-
larities may be observed between the market in which leasehold
estates are bought and sold and the market for homes in fee, and these
differences are largely accounted for by the attributes of the rights
represented by a leasehold estate. Accordingly, before examining the
characteristics of the market for leaseholds and its behavior under
different economic conditions, it will be useful to examine the attri-
butes of leasehold estates.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESIDENTIAL
LEASEHOLD ESTATE
The outstanding characteristics of the residential leasehold estate are
its short term, usually one year or less, the fact that the purchaser of
the residential leasehold estate is ordinarily the direct user of the
services which use and occupancy provide, and the fact that these serv-
ices can be consumed only at the specified location. The short term
of the leasehold and the fact that rental payments are made at in-
tervals during the period of the lease agreement mean that in this
market there is not likely to be a financing problem. From the finan-
cial viewpoint, the chief importance of the leasehold estate is its effect
on the financing of other types of transactions, mainly the sales of
homes in fee. The nature of the service conveyed means that the
market, like the market for homes In fee, consists of numerous local-
ized markets which, while they may Overlap, are never identical.
1Bureauof the Census, 16th Census: 1940, Housing, Vol. 2, Part 1, Table 14,p. 45.
The estimated aggregate rental includes estimated rent for units not reporting rent.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKET FOR
RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLD ESTATES
Since most residential leases, though written, are not recorded, the
amount of information available about this market is greatly re-
stricted. There are neither comprehensive data on the number of
leasehold estates bought and sold nor on the prices and other terms
characteristic of completed transactions. Furthermore, in most com-
munities there are no counts of vacancies, except at census dates; no
centralized facilities for listing vacancies or offers to lease, except
during war emergencies; and no compilations of rents offered, asked,
and agreed upon. The individual tenant or landlord, lacking com-
prehensive and reliable information, falls back on newspaper adver-
tising, brokers' listings, and personal contacts.
The imperfection of the market is heightened by the fact that the
services conveyed by different ]easeholds cannot be directly and accu-
rately compared. As in the case of the purchaser of single-family
homes in fee, the prospective purchaser or seller must make rough
comparisons of dissimilar, and not always discernible, things. A
renter can only estimate the inconvenience of living another quarter
of a mile from public transportation or from a school; he has to rely
largely upon rumor or casual inquiry in judging the landlord's con-
sideration for the tenant; he can never know very much about the
kind of neighbors his landlord may select for him.
Likewise, the landlord cannot accurately compare his offering
with his competitor's, and he can only guess at the significance pro-
spective renters will ascribe to his competitive advantages or disad-
vantages. As a result of these market imperfections, the process by
which rents are arrived at is based upon general impressions rather
than on specific and detailed information.
The short lease term tends to make actual, if not nominal, resi-
dential rents more sensitive to changing market conditions than the
prices of single-family homes in fee, but compared with some other
prices they are very insensitive.2 Inasmuch as rent is determined in
2Anestablished rental tends, in practice, to be extended, and present tenants are
less likely to be affected by changes in rental schedules than are new tenants; landlords,
especially those living in two- to four-family structures which they own in fee, ordinarily
have an intimate acquaintance with their tenants and frequently continue existing
leases with little reference to changed conditions in the market; or they may be influ-
enced by personal considerations as much as by market conditions. Differences in the
behavior of nominal and actual rents will he discussed later in this chapter.w —- --
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advance for the term of the lease, however, pricing is not continuous,
and the rental, nominal or actual, for the leasehold in question does
not respond to changes in market conditions that occur during its
term.
This relative insensitivity is strengthened by the practice, preva-
lent in most urban communities, of having the major portion of resi-
dential leases expire on the first day of September or October, or on
the first day of April or May.3 During the last thirty or sixty days of
their term, leases commonly permit the landlord to show the premises
to prospective tenants, with the result that the pricing and marketing
of residential leaseholds tends to be concentrated in the few weeks
preceding "moving day"; significant changes are not likely to be
made except during this period. Modifications in rents actually paid
are more likely to appear during these intervals in the form of con-
cessions than in adjustments of nominal rental schedules.
Another characteristic of the rental market is the dominance in
it of structures containing oniy one, two, three, or four dwelling
units. The major portion of these homes not occupied by the owner
in 1940—7,544,193—was in single-family structures; the next largest
number, 3,682,788, in two-family structures (Table 32). In structures
containing dwelling units for four families or less, there were 13,-
850,294 units not owner-occupied, while there were only 3,826,731
in structures containing five or more dwelling units; that is to say,
nearly 80 percent of all rented dwelling units were in structures hous-
ing four families or less.
Thus, there were almost as many dwelling units not occupied by
the owner in two-family structures as in large apartment structures
containing five or more dwelling units. And there were almost twice
as many single-family houses rented or vacant as there were dwell-
ing units rented or available for rent in structures for five or more
families.
Complete information on the distribution of rental dwelling
units by type of structure is available only for 1940, but these data
provide a basis for estimating the proportion in other years of rental
dwelling units in structures containing four dwelling units or less.
In 1940 there were undoubtedly more single-family houses rented or
3Whilethere are actually two moving days, one in the spring and one in the autumn,
in most communities one or the other is the more important.-w
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TABLE 32 —NUMBEROF URBAN AND RURAL-NONFARM DWELLING UNITS
OWNER-OCCUPIED, TENANT-OCCUPIED, AND VACANT OR FOR
SALE OR RENT, BY TYPE OF STRUCTURE, 1940 a
Typeof Owner- Tenant- Vacant, For
Structure Occupied Occupied Sale or Rent Total
Single-Family 9,506,758 6,763,881 780,312 17,050,951
Urban 6,116,999 4,145,797 330,105 10,592,901
Rural-nonfarm 3,389,759 2,618,084 450,207 6,458,050
2-Family 1,236,310 3,529,585 153,203 4,919,098
Urban 1,068,606 3,021,128 127,710 4,217,444
Rural-nonfarm 167,704 508,457 25,493 701,654
3-Family 217,391 1,094,809 56,884 1,369,087
Urban 201,579 1,015,683 51,216 1,268,478
Rural-nonfarm 15,815 79,126 5,668 100,609
4-Family b 317,473 1,374,010 97,610 1,789,093
Urban 228,885 1,219,277 84,043 1,532,205
Rural-nonfarm 88,588 154,733 13,567 256,888
.5-Family or More 75,302 3,485,767 340,964 3,902,033
Urban 72,271 3,429,473 325,223 3,826,967
Rural-nonfarm 3.031 56.294 15,741 75,066
All Types 11,353,237 16,248,052 1,428,973 29,030,262
Urban 7,688,340 12,831,358 918,297 21,437,995
Rural-nonfarm 3,664,897 3,416,694 510,676 7,592,267
a Bureau of the Census, 16th Census: 1940, Housing, Vol. 2, Part 1, Table 4, p. 10.
bIncludesone- to four-family dwellings with business use.
available for rent than at any other period, excluding perhaps the
trough of a severe depression. Consequently, the proportion in 1940
of rental dwelling units in structures housing four families or less
may be somewhat higher than the average over the cycle.
Assuming that the distribution of dwelling units by size of struc-
ture in 1940 is roughly representative of the distribution for other
years and, though these assumptions are extreme, that all single-fam-
ily houses are owner-occupied, that one dwelling unit in each two-,
three-, and four-family structure is occupied by the owner, and that
all dwelling units in structures containing five or more units are
rented or available for rent,4 then more than 4,600,000 dwelling
units, or more than 50 percent of all those for rent or available for
rent, would be in structures housing four families or less.
Finally, notwithstanding the large number of 'cases in which a
4Inthe census classification "one- to four-family dwelling units with business," it is
assumed that the average structure contains three dwelling units, of which two are rental.MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 95
leaseof one dwelling unit in the two-, three-, or four-family structure
is almost automatically renewed from year to year, the rental market
is greatly affected by the mbbility of tenants. Surveys made by the
Works Progress Administration (the predecessor of the Works Proj-
ects Administration) in the middle thirties, covering 190 places and
over three million tenant families, indicated that 39.6 percent of, the
families studied had occupied their then present dwelling for less
than one year, 57 percent for less than two years, and 82 percent for
less than five years.5 According to the 1940 Census of Housing, less
than 24 percent of the tenant families enumerated in that year lived
in the same house as in 1935.6 Finally, reports from the sample Cen-
sus of 1947 indicate that 58 percent of all persons living in the Akron
area in 1947 had moved during the seven years since 1940, as well as
71, 56, and 44 percent of those living in the Denver, Minneapolis,
and Boston areas, respectively (Table 33).
In summary, the residential leasehold is sold in a localized and re-
stricted market; its term is usually short, and the price is fixed in ad-
vance; rents are relatively insensitive to changing market conditions,
a sluggishness accentuated by the practice of concentrating lease re-
newals in a short period of the year, and by the predominant position
in the market .of the landlord of the small structure who, in many
cases, has personal relationships with tenants. The relatively high
mobility of tenant families, on the other hand, makes for greater
sensitivity of rents, and a rather sudden appearance or disappear-
ance of vacancies.
BEHAVIOR OF THE RESIDENTIAL RENTAL MARKET
The characteristics of the market for residential leasehold estates
make it subject to wide fluctuations, like the market for single-family
homes in fee. While it is seldom uniform in its behavior, there are
certain changes in general economic conditions to which the market
reacts in a manner that permits a generalized description of its be-
havior. This description is given below in terms of the reactions of
the market to rising incomes, the characteristics of a "seller's" market
5PeytonStapp, Urban Housing, Works Progress Administration (1938) p. 21. See also
Citizens' Housing Council of New York, Why Do Tenants Move? (October 1940). This
study of the moving habits of 1,219 tenant families in Manhattan and Brooklyn, 1933-38,
revealed an average occupancy of approximately three years.
6Bureauof the Census, 16th Census: 1940, Population and Housing: Families, Tenure
and Rent, Table 18, p. 126.ww
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TABLE 33 —PERCENTAGEOF POPULATION OCCUPYING THE SAME DWELL-
ING IN 1947 AS IN 1940 AND PERCENTAGE THAT HAD MOVED







Dwelling Dwelling One County
Unit Unit to Another
Akron, Ohio 42% 53% 19%
Allentown, Pa. b 53 47 11
Atlanta, Ga. 40 60 24
Baltimore, Md. 48 52 19
Birmingham, Ala. 42 58 18
Boston, Mass. 56 44 12
Chicago, Ill. 45 55 10
Columbus, Ohio 40 60 20
Dallas, Tex. 26 74 31
Denver, Cob. 29 71 37
Detroit, Mich. 42 58 17
Los Angeles, Cal. 29 71 31
Lowell, Mass. c 54 46 8
Memphis, Tenn. 33 67 25
Minneapolis, Minn.d 44 56 19
New Haven, Conn. 56 44 10
New Orleans, La. 44 56 17
New York, N. y. e 47 53 15
Norfolk, Va. f 35 65 36
Philadelphia, Pa. 49 51 14
Pittsburgh, Pa. 51 49 8
Portland, Oreg. 30 70 37
Rochester, N. Y. 46 54 12
Salt Lake City, Utah 42 58 21
San Antonio,Tex. 33 67 26
San Francisco, Cal. g 33 : 67 38
Scranton, Pa. h 57 43 6
Seattle, Wash. 30 70 32
St. Louis, Mo. 42 58 16
Toledo, Ohio 45 55 15
Tulsa, 29 71 31
Washington, D. C. 38 62 35
Worcester, Mass. 57 43 7
Youngstown, Ohio 50 50 12
a Bureauof the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics,
Series P.21, No. 35 (August 1947) Table 3, p. 8.
b Includes Bethlehem and Easton, Pa.
cIncludesLawrence and Haverhill, Mass.
d Includes St. Paul, Minn.
eIncludesNortheastern New Jersey.
Includes Portsmouth and Newport News, Va.
gIncludesOakland, Cal.
h Includes Wilkes-Barre, Pa.MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 97
forresidential leasehold estates, the main features of the phase of
transition to a "buyer's" market, and the salient characteristics of the
latter. The unavailability of reliable data on market changes makes
it impossible to give an adequate statistical demonstration of how the
market responds to changing conditions of demand and supply. The
following is necessarily based on fragmentary data and on general ob.
servation of market conditions.
REACTION TO RISING INCOMES
A rising standard of living, generally coincident with higher in-
comes, is reflected in the housing market by the occupancy of more
space, by the enjoyment of better housing accommodations, and by
the movement of some families to more attractive neighborhoods.
These conditions, supplemented by a rapid rate of increase in the
formation of new families, quickly expands the aggregate demand
for housing. Some of this demand finds expression in the acquisition
of a home in fee by those who have been renting; a large portion ex-
presses itself in the rental of larger or better dwelling units, or in the
rental of separate units by new families. To the extent that the in-
crease in housing demand is not accompanied by an increase in the
number of dwelling units, vacancies are reduced, and vacancy lists
are transformed into waiting lists as landlords receive an increasing
number of inquiries for space.
During this period, many single-family homes move from a
rented to an owner-occupied status, some being purchased by former
tenants and others by newly-formed or established families. Many
owners withdraw their houses from the rental market by refusing to
renew leases, or they insert a cancellation clause in the renewal con-
tract which enables them to give prompt possession to a purchaser.
In most communities, and especially in smaller cities, only a small
proportion of all dwellings are in structures with more than one
dwelling unit, and there is seldom a shfficient number of single-fam-
ily dwellings for rent to give prospective tenants a wide choice in
location and quality. Consequently, only a few withdrawals of dwell-
ings from the rental market may bring about a situation in which the
tenure of rented single-family houses is uncertain. Home ownership
increases under these conditions as tenants must purchase a home in
fee in order to protect their tenure or to secure suitable dwellings.—
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Many families dispossessed from single-family homes probably choose
a dwelling in two-, three-, or four-family structures that provides the
most nearly similar accommodations, and the vacancies in these struc-
tures are more rapidly filled than those in the larger buildings.
In the early stages of expansion of the rental market, increases in
rents are modest and hesitant. The owner of a small structure wants
to secure one or two tenants rather than to ask, and fail to receive, a
higher rental. Landlords and managing agents dealing with a larger
number of units are gratified with the higher gross revenue that
comes with declining vacancies, and for a time do not want to run the
risk of asking for substantial rent increases and failing to get them.7
As waiting lists grow, this timidity disappears and rents rise more
rapidly. They eventually reach a point where it appears "cheaper to
own than to rent," and a considerable volume of single-family home
building is induced. If high incomes continue, however, new con-
struction is unlikely to provide dwellings for all who want them and
are able and willing to pay the prevailing prices. Eventually vacan-
cies for rent virtually disappear, and a housing shortage or a seller's
market develops.
CHARACTERISTICS OF A SELLER'S MARKET
In a seller's market, the landlord is in a strong bargaining, position
with respect to both his present and prospective tenants. Any change
by the present tenant is accompanied by the inconvenience of "mov-
ing day," and alternative accommodations, plus the cost of moving,
are likely to prove as expensive over a short-term leaseas renewal at
a higher rent. He is likely, therefore, to accept a considerable rent in-
crease rather than change dwellings.
The prospective tenant likewise has little choice. The lack of a
central listing of offerings makes it difficult to compare available
space and terms, and the task of finding a suitable dwelling increases
his readiness to pay a rent increase. This willingness to accept higher
rentals is strengthened, in both cases, by the fact that decisions are
made under the pressure of an approaching moving day.
Construction of dwellings for rent increases rapidly as the evi-
dence that rents will continue to rise becomes more convincing. The
7 James C. Downs (The Principles of Real Estate Management, Chicago, 1947, p. 17)
estimates that rent increases cannot be effectively asked for by landlords until occupancy
has reached approximately 95 percent.w
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increase seems likely to appear first in the smaller types of structure—
two-, three-, and four-family buildings—the major portion of which
are constructed by operative or speculative builders and sold to
owner-occupants. Sales appeal usually emphasizes the economy of
ownership by showing that a large portion of the carrying charges can
be met by the rental income. A relatively small commitment of capi-
tal is involved and, in a rising market, the builder's investment is for
a short period only.
Some light is thrown on this pattern in the estimates of construc-
tion activity following World War I. Construction of two-family
structures reached a peak in 1923 when some 175,000 such dwelling
units were completed, while single-family home construction reached
its peak in 1925 when 572,000 were built. Three- and four-family
units are not separately reported, but they may have been responsi-
ble for the increasing volume of "more than two-family" structures
constructed in the early twenties. The peak of construction activity
was not reached in this category until 1927 when 257,000 dwelling
units were built, but by that time the larger multi-family structures
predominated and probably account for the continuation until 1930
of considerable volume of construction.8
Data are not sufficiently detailed and accurate to permit intensive
analysis of the relationships that develop in this sequence of construc-
tion movements, but it appears that the building of large multi-fam-
ily structures does not achieve great volume until a seller's market
has prevailed long enough to have produced a considerable rise in
rents. It is not clear whether rents must rise until they represent an
acceptable rate of return upon the cost of developing large apartment.
projects, or whether they must rise until the expectation of a con-
tinued rise becomes general.. At any rate, the production of a large
volume of multi-family housing is slow to develop; compared with
the increases that come in single- and two-family structures and prob-
ably in three- and four-family structures as well.
A seller's market prevails and rents continue to rise throughout
the period of slowly increasing residential construction. In the pe-
riod immediately preceding moving day the individual landlord
makes up the rental schedule which he proposes to ask for his leases.
8Housingand Home Finance Agency, Housing Statistics Handbook (1948) Table 2,
p.6.w
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Present tenants are usually not notified of the schedule until the rent-
ing season has arrived, and the landlord has the right to enter and
show the premises to prospective tenants, thus allowing the present
tenant little time to accept or reject the landlord's renewal proposal.
The landlord's competitive advantage is augmented by the fact that
the tenant cannot shop earlier for other quarters, since other land-
lords do not then know what vacancies they will have.
The minimum rental increase is likely to be the approximate cost
of moving plus some allowance for annoyance and inconvenience,
but rents may rise in the same proportion as the increase in income,
or to a greater extent.9 When the latter happens, and numerous rent-
ers face the necessity of spending more for rent than previously, or of
accepting a reduction in their housing standards, unrest may become
so widespread as to in some form of public intervention.'0
As construction of multi-family structures increases, new struc-
tures are designed to embody the latest equipment and conveniences
and are planned to attract prospective tenants, even though the rent
schedule is higher than in older sttuctures. It may be said that the
new units are added at the topofthe market.
For a time (provided rents do not increase more than incomes)
leases on the new units will be satisfactorily negotiated, mainly with
families who want to improve their housing standards. The dwelling
units they vacate will be occupied for the most part by families with
lower incomes who are improving their own housing standards.
Thus, a general filtering-up occurs during such a period. The success
with which higher rents are asked for and obtained on new dwelling
units ordinarily induces the landlords of previously existing struc-
tures to ask for increases as leases are terminated. As long as incomes
sustain these demands, they are on the whole successful.
9 The data are not comprehensive or precise, but it is noteworthy that from 1916 to
1924, during most of which time a seller's market prevailed, per capita payments to in-
dividuals (excluding entrepreneurial savings) increased by nearly 55 percent, according
to Simon Kuznets (National Income and Its Composition, Vol. 2, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1941, pp. 438 and 470) and rents by 61.8 percent, according to the
rent index (1935-39 =100)of theBureau of Labor Statistics (Changes in Cost of Living
in the United States, 1913-41, Bulletin No. 699, p. 43) and by 83.2 percent according to
the index (January 1939 =100)of the National Industrial Conference Board (Robert A.
Sayre, Consumers Prices, 1914-18, pp. 35 and 36).
10 During and after both world wars, this intervention came in all Western European
countries and in the United States.MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 101
THE MARKET IN TRANSITION
With new units being fed in at the top of the market, it becomes
more and more difficult to fill them; the time necessary to acquire a
satisfactory level of occupancy increases, and heavy vacancies may be
sustained in structures not completed in time to compete for occu-
pancy prior to moving day. In order to meet this situation, con-
cessions—most commonly in the form of one or two months' free
occupancy—are made to obtain high occupancy and to maintain the
appearance of a rent schedule well above that prevailing in the area.11
As provision is made in new structures for more and more tenant
families, especially under the lure of concessions, landlords of older
structures face the alternative of losing tenants or making their own
offering more attractive through repairs, modernization and im-
provements, and by a reduction in rent schedules. The first alterna-
tive is often chosen as an inducement to tenants to renew leases, or
to execute new ones at the same rent. Such inducements multiply
rapidly as vacancies increase, but when they prove inadequate, rents
are reduced by concessions.
As indicated, the use of concessions is partly to obtain a bargain-
ing advantage and partly to give the appearance of high earnings to
prospective purchasers of the fee, but it is in some measure a reflec-
tion of t'he landlord's opinion (or hope) that the situation is tempo.
rary and that soon concessions can be abandoned. The result is that
the rental schedule survives essentially unimpaired until the ap-
proach of another moving day.
If incomes do rise or remain stable, the landlord may be able to
reduce concessions or abandon themaltogether; if not, he may have
to increase concessions further or openly to reduce rents. In any
event, the action has to be taken well in advance of moving day. The
tenant, too, is obliged to make a hasty decision. The possibility of
obtaining increased concessions or a lower rent if he delays signing a
new lease until after moving day must beweigSed against the chance
that after his lease expires it may be automatically renewed on iden-
11 As early as 1925, this practice became so common in Chicago that, at the sugges-
tion of the Chicago Real Estate Board, and in order to prevent fraud in the sale of
apartment houses on the basis of a capitalization of swollen rent rolls, the Illinois Legis-
lature made it a penal offense for a landlord to grant concessions unless he marked all
leases in connection with which they were granted in letters at least one-half inch in
height: "Concession Granted" (Jones' ill. Stat. Ann.,. 1935, 72.41 to 72.47).102 URBANREAL ESTATE MARKETS
tical terms for another equal period, or that he may gain nothing and
be obliged either to move, or to accept the landlord's terms. Sig-
nificantly, it requires an offer sufficiently lower than the landlord's
to enable him to write off the cost of moving during the lease's term,
or equal advantages to induce him to move.
In the meantime, the volume of construction of all types of struc-
tures increases. As already indicated, the construction of two-family
structures was at its peak in 1923; the construction of single-family
structures in 1925. In the latter year, these two types accounted for
about 729,000 new dwelling units out of a total of 937,000. Rents rose
rapidly from 1918 to 1925, making it appear more economical to own
than to rent; at least ownership afforded an escape from further rent
increases. In the short run this probably pros ed true, since during the
period 1920-24 approximately two million single-family homes and
294,000 two-family structures providing 588,000 dwelling units were
built. Assuming that half the units in the two-family structures and
all the single-family homes were occupied upon completion by new
owners, over two and a quarter million families became homeowners
during this period.'2 This number is about 25 percent of the number
of tenant families in 1920. Further, it may be assumed that the
new homeowner families had higher-than-average incomes for their
neighborhoods. In any event, it appears that while rental units are
fed in at the top of the rental market, that market is simultaneously
drained of its customers by their conversion to homeowners.
CHARACTERISTICS OF A "BUYER'S MARKET"
As an increasing number of families shift from a rental to an owner-
ship status, competition among landlords, increasing in intensity as
moving day approaches, leads to concessions and reductions in rental
schedules. In the disorganized market process that develops, tenants
are able to make favorable leases if they take full advantage of their
position. When vacancies appear at high and sustained levels of in-
come, rent reductions may increase occupancy. but not during a
12 Some would have been homeowners in 1920, but most of them would have sold
their old homes to new owner-occupants. While it cannot be assumed that previously all
purchasers of new homes were tenants, it may be assumed that the number of families
becoming owner-occupants increased by at least two and a quarter million (Housing and
Home Finance Agency, Housing Statistics Handbook, 1948, Tables 2 and 49, pp. 6 and
60, respectively). During these years, of course, the total number of families also in-
creased, but there are no reliable figures measuring this increase.w — —
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period of declining income. Thus, the decline in rents between 1925
and 1929 tended to increase occupancy, although perhaps not by as
much as was necessary to absorb the increase in dwelling units pro-
duced during that period, whereas after 1929 further rent reductions
were unimportant as a stimulant to higher occupancy. Accordingly,
competition among landlords becomes very keen in a period of fall-
ing income.
The ability of the individual landlord to reduce rents is mainly
determined by the level of his operating costs and fixed charges,
which vary substantially from one owner to another. Operating costs
and taxes, which do not vary proportionately with occupancy, are not
likely to differ greatly from one structure to another, but owing to
differences in the amount and terms of debt carried by different
structures, the debt service may become a crucial element in deter-
mining differences in competitive strength. Owners of small struc-
tures are frequently able to shift certain operating costs to the tenant,
or to absorb them through self-operation, and where their structures
are debt free, or carry very low debt charges, they can offer rentals
that many competing landlords cannot meet. The competitive pres-
sure on the owners of small structures is particularly strong since the
vacancy of one unit results in a relatively large percentage reduction
in total property income. Owners of large structures, on the other
hand, are more likely to carry heavy debt service charges and, if they
are unable to meet competition by cutting operating costs and defer-
ring maintenance, their only course, after unpaid taxes and interest
have accumulated, is to accept foreclosure or to give a voluntary deed
to the creditor in lieu of foreclosure.
The mortgagee, frequently a financial institution, may pay ac-
cumulated taxes out of reserves, and set rentals at a level sufficient to
cover only operating costs and current taxes. Since both of these
charges do not vary proportionately with occupancy, it would seem
likely, when there are vacancies, that some units would be offered at
rents too low to cover all costs. The landlord's fear, however, that a
knowledge of this preferential treatment will spread to other tenants
and that on the next moving day it will be necessary to reduce all
rents tends to discourage the adoption of this pricing policy. The
landlord may prefer to continue vacancies rather than to achieve full
occupancy at the cost of a drastic over-all reduction in rent schedules.104 URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS
While the lowest level to which rents can fall is set by operating costs
plus taxes, this level is not likely to be reached until after a few years
of declining income, a sustained high level of vacancies, and wide-
spread mortgage defaults.
There are some data to support these generalizations, though they
are neither so comprehensive nor so precise as are needed for full
proof. A Federal Housing Administration survey of apartment house
experience reveals that total expenses, exclusive of depreciation and
debt service, approached 100 percent of total income after several
years of depression in the thirties but that total expenses, so defined,
were never in excess of total income. In New York, for example, the
operating ratio 13ofan elevator apartment building renting between
$15 and $20 a room rose to a high of 98.3 percent in 1934; and an
apartment building renting at $30 to $50 a room experienced an
operating ratio of 97.7 percent in the following year (Table 84).
These average ratios do not necessarily mean that no apartment
house suffered an operating deficit during the period covered; many
debt-free buildings were operated at a loss, and were held only in the
hope of a market improvement, while others were boarded up or tax-
abandoned. Taking all apartments as a group, however, rents appear
to have been cut in the thirties to the point where rental income ap-
proached total annual expense, exclusive of depreciation and debt
service.'4
Throughout a period of declining rents it becomes more and
more apparent that it is "cheaper to rent than to own." Being com-
mitted only for the short term of a residential lease, the tenant can
take advantage of rent decreases, whereas the owner is usually com-
mitted to relatively inflexible fixed charges. As rents decline, fixed
charges compare less and less favorably with current rents; many sin-
gle-family homeowners find themselves unable to meet their fixed
charges with the result that, together with owners of heavily debt-
13Thatis, the ratio of operating costs, exclusive of depreciation charges and debt
service, to total rents collected. -
14 TheBureau of Labor Statistics index of rents (bc. cit.) paid by wage earners and
lower-salaried workers declined from a high point of 152.6 in December 1924 (1935-39 =
100)to a low of 93.8 in March 1935, a drop of 39 percent. The National Industrial Con-
ference Board index (bc. cit.) revealed a similar movement, a decline from a high of
123.3 (January 1939 =100)in 1924 to a low of 74.0 in 1933, or 40 percent. While there
are no satisfactory operating ratios for this period for the type of accommodations
covered by these indexes, reference to the data on operating ratios in Table 34 suggests
the conclusion that rent reductions and vacancy increases caused income to fall close
to the level of operating costs plus taxes.MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 105
TABLE 34— TOTAL EXPENSES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME FOR
TEN NEWYORKELEVATOR APARTMENT BuiLDINGs, BY AVER-
AGE RENTAL PER ROOM, 1926-35 a
Year
AverageRental perRoom
$10.00— $15.00— $20.00-. $80.00— All













1928 47.2 68.9 50.2 61.3 ..52.0
1929 47.5 59.4 56.4 60.1 56.0
1930 49.1 72.7 55.6 72.1 57.1
1931 50.8 90.1 62.2 78.9 63.8
1932 52.9 78.8 67.3 85.9 67.8
1933 63.6 74.4 77.4 93.1 76.2
1934 70.4 98.3 82.6 91.8 82.7
1935 58.3 92.4 79.9 97.7 78.7
No. of build-
ings covered 1 1 7 1 10
a FederalHousing Administration, A Survey of Apartment Dwelling Operating Ex-
perience in Large American Cities (1940) Table A-I, p. 12. Total expenses exclude de-
preciation and debt service charges.
burdened rental structures, they face foreclosure or the execution of
a deed in lieu of same.'5
Rents of single-family homes acquired through foreclosure can
fall to a lower level than rents of apartments in large structures, even
though both are usually offered unfurnished; the former may fre-
quently rent on terms that require the tenant to pay all costs of opera-
tion except repairs, maintenance, and taxes. This fact, in addition to
the widespread preference for single-family homes, especially by
families with children, may account for the relatively low vacancy
rate characteristic of these homes during a buyer's market. With few
exceptions, single-family homes showed the lowest vacancy ratio of
any type of structure in vacancy surveys, and in the few time series on
vacancies that are available.
Vacancy data are available for Denver by type of structure from
1930 through 1946 (Table 35). The highest level of vacancies for this
15 A decline in, the purchase price of single-family homes tends to reduce the dis-
crepancy between renting and owning costs, but this correction occurs slowly, since
real estate prices fall more slowly than rents. The lag is partially due to (1) the per-
sistence with which individual owners hold on to properties, with the hope that their
equity will not be so seriously reduced as current market conditions indicate, and (2) the
fact that financial institutions, in their capacity as owners of real estate acquired
through foreclosure, may postpone sales so as not to burden current earnings and
accumulated reserves excessively over a short period of time. Also, there is hope that a
price can be obtained in the future which will return the amount of their investment
in the property at the time of foreclosure.106 URBANREAL ESTATE MARKETS
35— PERCENTAGE OF DWELLING UNITS VACANT IN DENVER, COL-
ORADO, BY TYPE OF STRUCTURE, 1930-46 a
Typeof Structure
Year Single-
Family 2-Family Apartment5 Terraces All Types
1930 3.6% 8.1% 13.1% 16.5% 6.8%
1931 3.1 7.1 14.5 12.9 6.4
1932 3.9 10.4 16.9 16.0 7.7
1933 3.6 9.4 13.2 16.5 . 6.7
1934 2.2 4.1 6.7 9.4 3.8
1935 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.4 1.8
1936 .9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0
1937 1.1 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.2
1938 1.4 1.8 4.3 2.5 2.0
1939 1,3 1.9 4.7 1.9 2.0
1940 1.2 2.1 5.3 2.4 2.1
1941 1.3 1.1 4.0 1.6 1.9
1942 .5 .2 .1 .3 .4
1943 .3 .1 .1 .4 .3
1944 .4 .3 .1 .3 .3
1945 .3 .4 .0 .2 .2
1946 .3 .3 .0 .1 .2
a Bureau of Business and Social Research and CoElege of Business Administration,
"Real Estate Vacancies in Denver as of September 1946," University of Denver Reports,
Vol. 22, No. 2 (University of Denver, December 1946) Table 1, p. 2. Vacancies are those
reportçd for September of each year.
period in the years 1930 through 1933, when the percentage of
units vacant for all types of residences combined ranged between 6.4
and 7.7 percent, but during these years single- and two-family resi-
dences had a strikingly lower vacancy ratio than apartments and ter-
races. Vacancies in apartments, terraces, and two-family residences
were, respectively, four, three-and-a-half, and two-and-a-half times as
high as vacancies in single-family dwellings. Vacancies declined after
1934 and the differentials among various types of residences became
less pronounced.
Denver data for the same period, covering vacancies in structures
of different age, indicate that in the years 1930-33 older structures
tended to have a higher ratio of units vacant than newer buildings
(Table 36). This difference, however, also tended to disappear as
over-all vacancy ratios fell in the late thirties and early forties. In a
number of instances the vacancy ratios are highest for the last con-
structed houses (Table 36).
Vacancy data for Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio) for the pe-
riod 1932-46 reveal basically the same differential pattern whenMARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 107
TABLE 36— PERCENTAGE OF DWELLING UNITS VACANT IN DENVER, COL-
ORADO, BY PERIOD IN WHICH PROPERTY WAS BUILT, 1930-46 a
. Period Built
Year Prior
to1901 1901—15 1916—25 1926—35 1936—45 1946
All
Periods
1930 9.1% 6.3% 4.2% 4.8% .. .. 6.8%
1931 7.8 6.0 4.3 5.9 .. .. 6.4
1932 8.5 8.6 5.4 6.8 .. .. 7.7
1933 8.0 7.7 4.3 4.5 .. .. 6.7
1934 5.3 3.6 2.3 2.2 .. .. 3.8
1935 2.3 1.6 1.3 1.5 .. .. 1.8
1936 1.2 .8 .8 .6 13.4% .. 1.0
1937 1.2 .9 1.4 .9 6.9 .. 1.2
1938 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.6 5.7 .. 2.0
1939 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.8 5.3 .. 2.0
1940 1.9 2.1 1.7 2.1 3.9 .. 2.1
1941 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.6 5.2 .. 1.9
1942 .4 .3 .3 .3
. .7 . .4
1943 .4 .2 .2 .2 .2 .. .3
1944 .4 .8 .3 .2 .2 .. .3
1945 .2 .2 .2 .1 .5 .. .2
1946 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 2.1% .2
a Bureauof Business and Social Research and College of Business Administration,
"Real Estate Vacancies in Denver as of September 1946," University of Denver Reports,
Vol. 22, No. 2 (University of Denver, December 1946) Table 1, P. 2. Vacancies are those
reported for September of each year.
examined by type of structure (Table 37). In the year 1932, when
vacancies were 8.8 percent—their highest point in this series—only
3.3 percent of the single-family units were vacant, while 22 percent of
large apartments and terraces were unoccupied. As in Denver, the
decline in vacancies after 1932 was accompanied by a gradual reduc-
tion in the differences among the vacancy ratios for the different types
of structures.'6
Finally, it should be noted that while a buyer's market prevails
the construction of homes for rent as well as for sale is negligible.
Construction of two-family structures in the United States declined
to a low of 5,000 units in 1933 (providing for only 2,500 rental units,
on the assumption that one unit per structure was occupied by an
owner) from a high of 175,000 in 1923, and construction of more than
16 See S. B. Barber, "Urban Residential Vacancies, 1930.38," in the Bureau of For-
eign and Domestic Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 18, No. 8 (August 1938)
pp. 15-18, for additional comparisons of vacancies by type of structure for seventeen
areas in the United States. In general the differences are the same as revealed by the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 109
two-family structures from a peak of 257,000 units in 1927 to a low
of 9,000 units in 1932. Recovery in construction from these low
points was slow for both types of structures; at the peak during the
late thirties and early forties, when a buyer's market continued, only
28,000 units were provided in the two-family structures in the best
year and 68,000 units in structures for more than two families.17
THE EFFECTS OF RENT CONTROL ON THE
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL MARKET
Rent control in modern form appeared in Western Europe during
World War I, first in France and subsequently in all neutral as well
as belligerent countries.'8 I
Inall the Western European countries, and in the United States
of America where it appeared first in 1919, it takes the form of a
modification of rental contracts by public authority. The modifica-
tions consist of extension by public act of the term of lease by abroga-
tion of the landlord's right to possession of the leased premises, and
the fixing of a maximum rent which the landlord may demand or col-
lect for occupancy of the premises.
During and after the first World War, measures were also taken
by a number of municipalities and states, including action taken in
the District of Columbia, to prevent rent increases. A. statute was
passed by the New York Legislature in 1920 under which rents were
controlled for a varying period in the larger cities in the state and in
New York City until
During World War II, rent control was instituted in the United
States under the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of
17 An exception is the dwellings provided in public housing. Data are from Housing
and Home Finance Agency, Housing Statistics Handbook (1948) Table 2, P. 6.
18 For a description of these measures, see International Labour Office, European
Housing Problems Since the War, Series G, No. 1 (Geneva, 1924) especially pp. 17-37;
League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service, Urban and Rural Housing (Geneva,
1939) passini; Karl Pribram, 'The Financing of House Building in Countries with Rent
Restriction Legislation," in the International Labour Office, International Labour Re-
view, Vol.18, Nos. 3 and 4-5 (September and October-November 1928) pp. 360-74 and
509-28, respectively; Edith Berger Drellich and Andrée Emery, Rent Control in War and
Peace (New York, 1939). See also A. A. Friedrich, "Rent Regulation," Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, Vol. 13 (New York, 1934) pp. 293-95, and bibliography there cited.
19 For a description of these measures and their operation, including citations of
court decisions, see Marcus Whitman, "The Public Control of House Rents," Journa'
of Land and Public Utility Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July 1925) pp. 343.61; and also
Hubert F. Havlik, "Recent History of the Control of House Rents," Journal of Land
and Public Utility Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1930) Pp. 95-98.110 URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS
1942 20andthe regulations promulgated under the Act by the Office
of Price Administration. The principal features of the regulations
provided that landlords could not demand or accept payment of rent
from tenants in occupancy in excess of the amount paid or payable
on a date fixed in the regulation. Landlords were required to register
with the local office of the OPA all residential accommodations under
lease on the effective date of the regulation or at any subsequent date
when premises were leased. Under the regulation, all the services
provided had to be continued by the landlord and rents could not be
increased except with the approval of the OPA. Possession of leased
premises was also denied to the landlord except under certain speci-
fied conditions, and then only after the case had been submitted to
the OPA and permission for ejection of the tenant had been received.
Many of the operations of the OPA were abandoned shortly after
the termination of hostilities. The administration of the rent control
features of the Act were continued by amendments passed from time
to time by Congress as the original Act and its subsequent amend-
ments or substitute acts were about to expire. No complete history
of the Office of Price Administration and its successors has been writ-
ten. The subject of rent control has been of recurring interest. With
the scanty information available, it is possible only to review some of
the major apparent effects of this legislation.
The effects of rent control on the residential rental market flow
from the two major ways in which it alters rental contracts—namely,
by the substitution of a maximum established by law or regulation
for negotiation between landlord and tenant as a means of determin-
•ing rentals, and by the automatic extension of the terms of leases
through restricting the landlord's power to recover possession and
occupancy of the premises. Its direct effect, of course, is on renting
families and on the owners of rental properties; owner-occupant
families are affected only indirectly, except where they choose to
•to take advantage of increased real estate prices. Rent control thus
protects the housing standards and housing costs of only those fami-
lies that are renting at the time of imposition of rent control and
continue occupancy of the same quarters or that are fortunate
enough subsequently to find quarters at the controlled rent. The size
of this group is indicated by the fact that, in 1940, 41.1 percent of
20January30, 1942, c. 26, 56 Stat. 23.w
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nonfarm families lived in houses they owned in fee and 52.6 percent
in 1947; 21thisgroup, then, was in the minority in 1947.
The imposition of a maximum limit on rents during a period of
rising incomes naturally reduces the proportion of tenant income ex-
pended on shelter; consequently, one of the early effects of rent con-
trol is likely to be a shifting of families into larger and better quarters
and a rapid absorption of existing vacancies, especially in the better
housing accommodations. Since the price of alternative quarters can-
not be raised, they can be acquired for a rent that may be no more,
and even less, than the proportion of family income previously ab-
sorbed by this item. Under these conditions residential leases become
a conspicuous bargain and are rapidly bought up by newly-formed
families, by households newly established, by "undoubling," by fami-
lies' migrating from one area to another, and by the spreading out of
families and households into more adequate space. Some families
may choose to spend a declining proportion of income for rent, but
in many instances the early stages of rent control witness a rapid rise
in housing standards.
If the increase in income is widespread, a shortage of space seems
likely first to occur in accommodations in the middle rent groups;
space is sought after in this range by the large number of families
moving into the middle-income groups and seeking to improve their
housing standards. Concurrently, vacancies in the lowest rent groups
are likely to increase. As vacancies disappear in the middle rent
ranges, however, occupancy increases rapidly in both the higher and
the lower rent ranges, and complaints of a shortage are more gener-
ally heard. Premises at the bottom of the rent scale are ordinarily the
last to fill up and those at the top next to the last.
There is little statistical evidence on these developments under
rent control, but some data on vacancy by rent range are available
for New York and Boston in studies undertaken by the Office of Price
21Bureauof the Census, Current Population Reports, Housing, Series P.70, No. 1
(October 1947) Table 2, P. 10. This is probably a much larger percentage than prevails
in Europe, where rent control originated during World War I. A discussion of the con-
traction in the number of homes available for rent resulting from the shift from tenancy
to home ownership during the period of rent control is found in "Effect of Wartime
Housing Shortage on Home Ownership" in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly
Labor Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (April 1946) pp. 560-66. This article presents the results of
a survey of 122 areas representing one-fourth of the total occupied nontarm dwelling
units. In all but one of these cities, the ratio of owner-occupied to total dwelling units
increased from 1940 to 1944-45. The median increase was 28 percent, while one-fourth
of the cities revealed increases of more than 36 percent.112 URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS
Administration.22 In New York, after 1941, the vacancy-loss ratio de-
clined consistently for all classes of apartment buildings where the
average monthly rent was $30 or over (Table 38). On the other hand,
the rent class under $30 revealed an increase in the vacancy-loss ratio
during the years 1942 and 1943; the ratio for this lower rental group
of apartment houses had declined to 6.6 percent in 1945, at which
time the average ratio for all rent ranges was 1.1 percent.
TABLE 38— VACANCY-Loss RATIOS IN 1,527 APARTMENT BUILDINGS IN
NEW YORK CITY, BY AVERAGE MONTHLY RENTAL, END OF
YEAR,
1939 1910 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Under $30.00 7.5% 7.5% 8.8% 10.3% 12.4% 10.6%6.6%
30:00 —39.99 5.6 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.1 2.0 .6
40.00 —49.99 4.9 6.1 7.3 5.7 38 1.1 .6
50.00 —59.99 9.1 10.2 10.9 8.3 3.8 1.1 .4
60.00 —74.99 7.7 9.7 11.2 9.5 5.0 1.1 .6
75.00 —99.99 9.9 9.5 11.3 10.8 5.0 .7 .5
100.00 and over 8.4 8.8 12.5 11.2 7.6 2.0 .7
All rent ranges7.0% 7.9% 9.3% 8.0% 5.5% 2.1% 1.1%
a Office of Price Administration, Accounting Department, Operating Cost Study,
Apartments (New York, September 9, 1946) Exhibits 1-8. Vacancy-loss ratio is scheduled
income minus net actual rental income expressed as a percentage of scheduled income.
The 1,527 apartment buildings include 47,273 apartments and 1,338 store units in the
five boroughs.
The shift in the impact of increased demand from one rental
group to another, as reflected in vacancy-loss data, confirms the state-
ments made above. From 1939 to 1942, the lowest vacancy-loss ratios
were in the two rental classes ranging from $30 to $50 a month. In
1943, however, when the over-all vacancy loss dropped from 8.0 to
5.5 percent, the lowest vacancy loss moved upward in terms of rental
classes, including apartment buildings where average rent ranged
from $40 to $60 per month. In the following year, low vacancy-loss
ratios, and the absorption of available space by increased demand
which these reflect, had been widened to include apartment houses
with average rentals ranging from $40 to $100. In 1945 all apartments
renting for $30 and over per month showed vacancy-loss ratios of
between 0.4 and 0.7 percent, while the rent class below $30 reflected
a loss of 6.6 percent.
22Thedata refer to vacancy loss, that is, to the dollar difference between actual
rental income and the scheduled income. This difference is expressed as a percentage
of scheduled income and will be referred to as the vacancy-loss ratio.MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS
In Boston, the pattern was similar but not identical (Table 39).
The rent classes "under $30" and "from $50 to $60" revealed the
TABLE 39— VACANCY-LOSS RATIOS IN 253 APARTMENT BUILDINGS IN Bos-
TON, MASS., BY AVERAGE MONTHLY RENTAL, END OF YEAR,
1939 1940 1941 1942
.
1943
Under $30.00 .9.0% 11.1% 7.6% 3.9% 6.1%
80.00 —39.99 6.6 5.5 3.9 2.5 1.5
40.00 —49.99 8.5 6.5 4.5 1.3 .9
50.00 —59.99 13.3 11.8 9.6 5.0 . .7
60.00 —74.99 8.7 6.1 5.9 2.1 .2
75.00 and over . 5.0 6.2 4.6 3.7 .5
a Officeof Price Administration, Accounting Department, Net Income Before Interest
andDepreciation by Rental Ranges, Apartments July 17, 1944) Exhibits 1-6.
For definition of vacancy-loss ratio, see Table 38, footnote a.
highest vacancy-loss ratios from 1939 to 1942; in 1943, however, the
vacancy-loss ratios for apartments with average rentals under $30 al-
most doubled—rising from 3.9 to 6.1 percent, while vacancy losses
fell in all other rental ranges.
Additional data on. Manhattan apartment house vacancies, pub-
lished by the Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., conform in gen-
eral with the above. Vacancies in elevator and walk-up apartments
(excluding "old law" tenements) increased from 1937 to 1941, de-
clined abruptly after 1942 and disappeared in 1944. Vacancies in
eleven typical tenement areas, on the other hand, continued to rise
until 1944 and did not disappear until 1947 (Table 40).
Finally, data on vacancies in old and new law tenements in Man-
hattan during the years 1916 to 1924 suggest that during this period,
when population was increasing in the area, the better apartments
were absorbed more rapidly than those of low quality (Table 41). In
1916 the vacancy ratio was 4.0 percent in new law apartments and 6.5
percent in the old law type; vacancies were reduced much more
quickly in the former group and fell to a low—0.1 percent—in April
1920, a year earlier than the low point of vacancies for the latter type.
It is difficult to gauge the effect of the emergency rent laws in this sit-
uation, however, since they were not introduced until the spring of
1920, when the over-all vacancy ratio had dropped to 0.4 percent.
As vacancies decrease throughout the rental scale, the housing
shortage is intensified and rental houses tend to be pre-empted by114 URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS
TABLE 40— PERCENTAGE OF DWELLING UNITS VACANT IN ELEVATOR AND





























a Real Estate Board of New York, Management Division, Survey of Competitive
Apartments in Manhattan, Apartment Series, Supplement No. 29 (June 15, 1947) and
Vacancy Survey of Manhattan Tenement Areas, Tenement Series, No. 9 (March 1947).
Data on walk.up apartments exclude "old law" tenements; data on tenements are for
vacancies in eleven typical tenement areas in Manhattan.
bLessthan 0.5 percent.
TABLE 41 —PERCENTAGEOF DWELLING UNITS VACANT IN OLD AND NEW
LAW TENEMENTS IN NEW YORK CiTY, 19 16-24 a
Date Old New Total
March 1916 6.5% 4.0% 5.6%
March 1917 4.9 1.8 3.7
March 1919 3.3 .6 2.2
April 1920 .5 .1 .4
February 1921 .2 .2 .2
March 1923 .2 .5 .4
January 1924 .5 1.2 .8
a Report of the Mayor's Committee on Housing, February 29, 1924, p. 4, as quoted in
EdithBerger Drellich and Andrée Emery,Rent Control in War and Peace (New York,
1939)p.104.
presenttenants who can be forced to relinquish use and occupancy
only for violations of the rent control law or regulations, or for such
other reasons as the remodeling of the structure or the owner's need
of the premises for his own occupancy and use.23 As a result of these
23Wherethe landlord's interest has beenpledged as security for a mortgage loan
thisimpairment of his interest may cause the mortgagee to ask for full payment, or at
least a heavy curtail, on expiration of the mortgage term. Therefore, it has sometimes
been necessary to extend control beyond rents to the indebtedness underlying the fee
ownership. See Carl M. Wright, "Housing Policy in Wartime," in the International
Labour Office, International Labour Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 1940) pp. 14 and 15,
and also Karl Pribram, "The Financing of House Building in Countries with Rent
Restriction Legislation," International Labour Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1928)
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restrictions,the whole rental market becOmes frozen and renting
families are unable to improve their housing because all the dwell-
ings representing higher are taken; while those that are
compelled to move, or happen to have entered the market after
vacancies were absorbed, are unable to exercise choice as to their
housing accommodations.
The rapidity with which vacancies may be absorbed in a period of
expanding demand is indicated by studies of the Office of Price Ad-
ministration covering the years 1939-46. Vacancy-loss ratios for apart-
ment buildings in sixty-three cities averaged 8.6 percent in 1939, 2.8
percent in. 1942, and 0.2 percent in 1944 (Table 42). Small structures
had a similar experience; the vacancy-loss ratio fell from 9.1 percent
in 1939 to 2.1 percent in 1942 and then to 0.4 percent in June 1946
(Table 43).
Variations in vacancy experience are found in different areas. In
New York City apartment buildings, for example, the vacancy-loss
ratio rose from 7.0 percent in 1939 to 9.3 percent in 1941 and then
declined to 1.1 percent in 1945. This course is perhaps attributable
to.the fact that the industrial boom came to New York late in the
defense program. In Macon, Georgia, and Tacoma, Washington, on
the other hand, where defense activity started at an earlier date,
vacancy loss was reduced to 1.3 and 2.1 percent, respectively, in 1941,
dropping to virtually zero in 1942.
A further effect of rent control, tending to aggravate the residen-
tial rental market conditions described above, is the withdrawal of
single-family homes from the rental market through sale. Some indi-
cation of the extent to which this takes place is indicated by the fact
that, despite the construction of 3,726,300 dwelling units in the in-
terim,24 the number of nonfarm dwelling units rented or available
for rent in 1947 was but 15,562,000 compared with 17,763,910 in
1940.25 There was no control over sale price during this period with
the result that transactions were made at prices reflecting the full im-
pact of increased demand and reduced available supply.
The adverse effect of rent control Ofl Construction, particularly
of rental housing, arises mainly from the fact that the cost of build-
24HomeLoan Bank Board, Statistical Summary, 1919, Table 20, p. 24.
25Bureauof the Census, 16th Census: 1940, Housing, Vol. 4, Part I, Table I, p. 2,
and Current Population Reports, Housing, Series P-70, No. 1 (October 1947) Table 1,
p.9.116 URBANREAL ESTATE MARKETS
TA.BLE 42 —VACANCY-LOSSRATIOS IN APARTMENT BUILDINGS FOR SIXTY-
THREE CITIES COMBINED AND FOR FIVE SELECTED CITIES, END
OF YEAR, 1939-46 a
City 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 19451946b
New York, N. Y. 7.0%7.9%9.3%8.0%5.5%2.1%1.1%..
Buffalo, N. Y. 8.3 8.6 4.9 2.0 1.0 .8 .6 .4%
Macon, Ga. 12.7 6.2 1.3 .1 C .2 .1 .1
Chicago, Iii. 5.9 4.5 3.2 1.6 .8 .3 .1 c
Tacoma, Wash. 7.6 6.5 2.1 .4 .1 .1 .2 .2
Avg. 63 cities 8.6%8.1%6.2%2.8% .9% .2% .2% .2%
a Data for sixty-three cities are from U. S. Congress, House,. Hearings before the
Committee on Banking and Currency, on H. R. 2549: Housing and Rent Control, 80th
Congress, 1st Session (1947) Table 1, p. 170. Individual city data are from Office of Price
Administration, Accounting Department, Operating Cost Studies, as follows: New York,
September 9, 1946; Buffalo, February 13, 1947; Macon, January 29, 1947; Chicago,
February 14, 1947; Tacoma, February 11, 1947.
For definition of vacancy-loss ratio, see Table 38, footnote a.
b As of June 30.
CLessthan .05 percent.
TABLE 43 —VACANCY-LOSSRATIOS IN SMALL STRUCTURES FOR SIXTY
CITIES COMBINED AND FOR FOUR SELECTED CITIES, END OF
YEAR,





































Avg. 60 cities 9.1%7.0%4.2%2.1%1.0% .5% .5% .4%
a Datafor sixty cities are from U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Committee
on Banking and Currency, on H. R. 2549: Housing and Rent Control, 80thCongress,
1st Session (1947) Table 2, p. 170. Data for individual citiesarefrom Office of Price Ad.
ministration, Accounting Department, Operating Cost Studies, asfollows:New York,
September 9, 1946; Buffalo, February 13, 1947; Macon, January 29, 1947; Chicago,
February 14, 1947; Tacoma, February II, 1947.
For definition of vacancy-loss ratio, see Table 38, footnote a.
b As of June 30.
c Less than .05 percent.
ing, which soared in both belligerent and neutral countries during
and immediately after World Wars I and II, made it uneconomic for
new housing facilities to be constructed to rent at the controlled
levels. The gap between prevailing rents in existing structures and
those necessary in new ones becomes so large as to give prospective
builders little opportunity to judge whether the market will support
their operations. Realizing that they operate in a thin market, build-MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLDS 117
ersare reluctant to commit their funds in large sums, and it is only
through public intervention that a significant volume of rental hous-
ing construction can be secured until rents have become more equal-
ized or events have proven the strength of the market.26
If and when rents are equalized between controlled structures and
those newly built, renting families in the controlled structures must
spend a considerably higher proportion of their income for rent. Re-
sistance to this modification in the pattern of family expenditure is
likely to be strong and frequently results in rent control's becoming
a significant social and political issue.27
SUMMARY
Like the market for hQmes in fee, the market for residential lease-
holds, involving approximately one-half of all American families, is
restricted and localized. Under usual conditions, rents are fixed for
a year in advance, with renewal by to a brief pe-
riod of weeks preceding one of several moving days. This makes for
a stickiness of rents as compared with prices of goods and services
continuously being traded. The condition is accentuated by the
often personal relationship between landlord and tenant, but may be
offset to some extent by the relatively high mobility of tenant fam-
ilies.
In periods of rising incomes families seek to improve their, hous-
ing standards in terms of space and location; new families are
formed, households undouble, and the market expands. Under these
conditions vacancies contract and home ownership increases as sin-
gle-family homes are withdrawn from the rental market. Rents rise
as vacancies decrease, but new construction fails to aid the renter,
except moderately, since it consists predominantly of single-family
homes for sale to those to whom it appears cheaper to own than to
rent. A point is reached where a housing shortage develops and the
rental market swings into a seller's phase, in which the tenant is con-
26KarlPribram,cit., pp. 362 and 366.
27 protection, which began as a war emergency measure, became of the first
importance as an instrument of social welfare with which the countries shattered by
war could not dispense after the conclusion of peace. This development was the out-
come of its far-reaching effects on the standard of living of the wage-earning classes. ..
InternationalLabour Office, European Housing Problems Since the War, Series G, No. I
(Geneva, 1924) p. 26. Karl Pribrarn (op. cit., pp. 367.68) attributes the extensive public
housing programs in Western Europe after World War I partly to the effects of con-
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fronted with the choice of accepting rent increases or moving to
such alternative accommodations as are available.
As rents rise to high levels, the construction of new apartment
houses increases, but these are added at the top of the market. So
long as income levels are sustained, a general filtering-up occurs.
As the number of new rental units fed in at the top of the market
increases, however, it becomes progressively more difficult to fill
them. To meet this situation landlords give rent concessions to ob-
tain the appearance of high occupancy and maintain the prevailing
rent levels. As the rent on new dwellings declines, landlords of older
dwellings strive to meet the competition—first by modernization and
improvement and later by rent reduction, either directly or in the
form of a period of free occupancy.
At this point, a shift from a seller's to a buyer's market begins.
To compensate for rising vacancies landlords begin to reduce rent
in the hope of attracting additional tenants; but if this period is
accompanied by a decline in income levels, such a move is ineffectual
because occupancy responds more to declining incomes than to fall-
ing rents. Price competition for tenants becomes keen, and the land-
lords of the smaller structures have a competitive advantage inas-
much as their operating costs are lower. Similarly, the landlords with
the lowest debt service are in preferred positions. After a time, these
landlords reduce rents to such low levels that competing landlords
find they cannot earn their operating costs, taxes, and debt service.
They then face the alternative of making up the deficit from other
funds or going into foreclosure. The mortgage institution taking
over the structure can then set rental schedules at or above the level
necessary to earn operating costs and taxes. Thus, the minimum level
to which rents are likely to decline in large apartment houses is
represented by the costs of operation plus taxes.
A buyer's market, then, is characterized by a sustained high va-
cancy ratio, falling rents, high rate of foreclosure, and virtual cessa-
tion of residential construction. The tenant has a wide choice of
accommodations, and the landlord is caught between fixed operating
costs and taxes and declining rents and increasing vacancies.
The above account of the development of a seller's market and
eventual transition to a buyer's market applies in the absence of
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market may be summarized as follows: in a period of rising incomes,
vacancies are rapidly absorbed, first in the middle rent ranges, sub-
sequently in the higher ranges, and finally in the lowest ranges; those
families in a position to occupy better housing promptly are signifi-
cantly benefited after the inauguration of rent control. As vacancies
decline, however, rent control freezes the market, restricts the choice
of tenants entering the market, and contributes toward a housing
"shortage." This shortage of rental housing is intensified by thewith-
drawal of single-family homes from the rental market as landlords'
rights are restricted. The rental element of the cost of living is held
constant for renting families, but those that are homeowners when
it is initiated are affected only indirectly, benefiting in the event
that they sell subsequently at a higher price; latecomers in the hous-
market are placed at a distinct disadvantage, for they must buy
at high prices or accept lower housing standards represented by
rental market. "left-overs." During periods of rising building costs,
a wide differential between controlled rents in existing dwellings
and rents necessary to induce a large volume of rental construction
appears; heavy pressures for public action are created to protect the
interests of renting families in the standards of housing available at
controlled rent levels.